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ARTICLE

301

AND TURKISH STABILITY

Elizabeth V. White

I NTRODUCTION

Since the fall of 2005, more than sixty j o urnalists, academics, intellectuals and eve n
fi ctio n writers have b een subj ect to a rash of charges of "insulting Turkishness" under Article
30 1 of the Turkish Penal Code. This phen om eno n reinfo rces at the sam e time it restricts the
develo pment of free speech in Turkey at the cusp of a society precariously balanced between
EU accessio n and ultra- natio nalist isolatio nism .
Turkey canno t becom e a m ember of the European Union until it reconciles its need
to contro l the actio ns and words of its populous with its desire to reform and integrate. T he
following pages are intended to show that the divided and tumultu o us political landscape
builds blockades o n the road to E U accession as fas t as they can be knocked down . Turkey
is simultaneously m akin g prog ress and getting nowhere due in part to a fundam ental lack
of internal cohesio n with rega rds to the requirem ents and ramificatio ns of free speech as
defin ed by the standards of the EU.
Turkey's executive branch is at odds with its judicial bra nch and ultra-nationalist
lawyers and does n o t seem entirely comfo rtable w ith the suppression of the press. H owever,
du e to a surge in ultra- natio nalist voter support fo r certain judicial decisio ns, the current
AKP controlled government has ye t to find a politically sound way to address the m atter.
M embers of Turkey's free press are repeatedly brou ght up on charges which are then
m arginalized on case by case basis, indicating an aversion to dealing with Article 301
directl y. Article 301 and the issue of free speech is a deeply polarized issue in Turkey and
m any Turkish p olitical pundits o pine that a strong stance one way o r the other on Article
301 will no t be presented by the AK party until after the coming electio ns.
301
Article 30 1 took effect on June 1, 2005 , part of a packa ge of p enal-law reforms
introduced to bring Turkey up to E uropean Unio n standards and as a precursor to EU
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accession negotiations. Article 301 covers the following:
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisomnent of between
six months and three years.
2.A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic ofTurkey,
the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall
be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years.
3 . In cases where denigration of Turkish ness is committed by a Turkish citizen
in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third.
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a criIBe.
Article 301 is a not a new concept in Turkey. It was designed to replace Article 159,
a similar law that was part of the original penal code heavily influenced by Italian Fascism.
Other Turkish articles dealt with similar issues. In the 1980s when Turkey's Ozal government
was under international pressure to change Articles 141, 142 and 163 (Articles 141 and 142
were designed to "fight communism," and Article 163 targeted people with religious
sensitivities) all were scrapped and Article 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Law was created and used
in a similar fashion. So, while Article 301 is certainly not the only part of the Turkish Penal
Code that has fallen under criticism for curtailing freedom of expression and political
criticism or for its circular purpose of creation (i .e., Articles 318, 305, 216, and 7), it was
under the wording of Article 301 that the latest surge of charges against intellectuals and
journalists was carried out.
High Profile Cases
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an has stated that the European Union was
consulted during the creation of Article 301 and had no reservations at that time.!
Questions and concerns were raised only after the article was used to prosecute some
"Armenian personalities" and Turkish Nationals for comments regarding the Armenian
Genocide many say took place while the Ottoman Empire was collapsing after World War
I.
HRANT DINK

Indeed, one of the first high profile cases of "insulting Turkishness" was against Hrant
Dink , editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, who asserted that the
dramatic increase in the application of Article 301 had more to do with "Armenianness"
than "Turkishness". Dink was charged under Article 301 based on an article in his
newspaper regarding relations between Armenians and Turks. The court asserted that the
article contained a phrase implying that Turkish blood was" dirty". One argument is that
Dink's comment was confusing due to his poor Turkish. A translation of his statement reads,
'.' poison in the Armenian blood related to the fear and hatred of Turks" by which Dink
apparently meant that the "fear and hatred" ofTurks is a poison in Arrnenian blood; however,
due to the wording many interpreted his words as saying that Turkish blood itself was
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poison. Dink himself flatly denied any wrongdoing and repeatedly insisted that the article
was intended to improve relations between the two groups. Dink was found guilty and
sentenced to six months in prison , despite the Prosecutor General's Office obj ections based
on the fourth clause 2 The guilty verdict was passed seven to two. In their dissent, the two
judges (one of which was the chairman) expressed concern that the verdict reflected a poor
understanding of the no rms of the EU regJrding the right to criticize and boldly stated ,
"There is still fear for expressing tho ught of dissent in Turkey. No opinion, which has been
tried and sellt to jail dies. On the contrary. such opini o n finds other suppo rters. One should
know that dissent can not be prevented by creating fear for punishment."3
Hrant Dink was sho t three times in the head on the m o rning ofJanuary 19, 2006 , not
far fi'0l1l the offices of Agos. The gunman, a troubled young man not yet twenty, is said to
have yelled, " I sho t the non-Muslim' " and then £led the scene. H e was later apprehended.
Tho usands of people m arched in Istanbul in protest of his death, some calling Dink a martyr
to the cause of the abolishment of Article 301. Turkish offi cials and international dignitaries
alike have expressed deep sorrow tor Dink's death.
RAGIP ZARAKOLU

Around the same time that Dink was brought up on charges, publisher Ragip
Zarakolu was charged under Article 301 fo r publishing two books, o ne referring to the mass
depo rtations of Armenians in 1915 carrying a seven and a half year sentence and ano ther
entitled A n A numiall Doctor ill Turkey carrying a six yea r sentence Zarakolu has ye t to stand
trial for.
PERIHAN MAG DEN

A D ecember 2005 newspaper colurnn by Perihan Magden is the basis for another
high- profile case. The writer and journalist faced a three year prison sentence fo r the article
which strongly defends the idea of conscientious objection and the refusal to perform
military service. Conscientious objection is illegal in Turkey and is punishable by
imprisolUllent, as is any o ther avoidance of conscription. Magden was acquitted o n June 27 ,
2006 when the court ruled that the opinions expressed in the article were covered by
fre edom of expression and therefore not a crime.
ORHAN PAMUK

In February of 2005 Article 301 vaulted into the international consciousness when,
during an interview with the Swiss publication Das Magaz in , Turkey's renowned author
Orhan Pal11uk stated, "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these
lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it."The backlash that followed forced Pamuk
to £lee the country. D emonstrations were staged and his books were burned . C harges were
brought against hirn upo n his return to Turkey later in 2005 .
Because Pamuk was charged under an ex post fac to law, approval was required from
the Ministry ofJustice in order to prosecute. That approval n ever came. OnJanuary 22 , 2006
the ministry declared that it had no authority to open a case against Pamuk under the new
penal code and thus the charges agJinst Pamuk were dropped. That week the European
Union begain their review of the Turkish justice system .
Pamuk 's m ost recent novel, Snow, addresses the urgent issues of secularism and religion
in a country that has been torn between the two for most of the last century. While his
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comments to a Swedish newspaper unleashed a slew of charges and threats of death and
imprisonment, his acclaimed novel was released without incident. Later, on the BBC's
Hardtalk , Pamuk indicated that his remarks in Das Magazill were intended to draw attention
more to the issue of free speech in Turkey than to the m assacres themselves.
The prosecution of critics and dissenters has few apparent advantages for Turkey.
Indeed, each charge compounded by the dissenting voices within the govenU11ent itself. In
Dink's case, the Prosecutor General's Office pointed out that the fourth clause makes it clear
that criticism is not a crillle, to no avail. Ragip Zarakolu 's case drags on in the courts,
postponement after postponem ent, serving only to highlight Turkish dissent and bringing
into question Turkey's EU compatibility. Perihan Magden faced a harsh three year sentence
fo r an article that was later declared by the courts to be simply a matter of freedom of
speech . With Pamuk, the Justice Ministry eventuall y decla red that they had no authority to
try him based on Article 301. At the height of m edia scrutiny was the case of Elif Safak,
when the Turkish government deem ed necessary prosecutio n over the remarks of fictional
charac ters.
ELiF SAFAK

Safak, as with Pallluk. had the charges against her driven forward by "ultra-nationalist"
lawyers, indicating that while the apparent campaign to protect "Turkishness" is not one
initiated by the conservative AKP government it is, however, clearly not an issue that the
dominant party would rather address. In September 2006 the then heavily pregnant Safak
stood trial for only a few minutes before her case was thrown o ut. In an October 2006
interview on NPR 's A ll Thillgs Considered, Safak gave her view that the real target of her trial
was not herself but instead Turkey's European Unio n accession bid . The novel , The Bastard
C?f Istallbul, became a bestseller in its Turkish release.
Public Reaction
As evidenced above, several of the charges filed under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal
Code quickly became high profile m edia frenzies. In Turkey, Ultra-nationalists were riled by
the controversial statements of those on trial. More liberal fa ctions (mainly pro-EU) were
o utraged by Turkey's willingness to try the cases. Of the latter, there are many who believe,
both within Turkey and internationally, that the charges bro ught forth under Article 301
were not filed in order to protect "Turkishness" or even to stifle dissenting opinions but
instead to serve the purposes of the ultra-conservative "old-guard" who have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo and keeping Turkey o ut of the European Union. 4
In other cases it seems that politicians view Article 301 as a non-issue ; that is,
som ething that is not necessary to gain power and som ething that has many apparent
disadvantages to address. M ost government officials attempt to downplay the effects of
Article 301, the main defense being that no one has ever been imprisoned under Article
301. "Now we can say 'no' - but there is someone who was shot and who died," M ehmet
Tezkan wrote in Vatan newspaper. "Then [the ministers] will be silenced."5
While Hrant Dink 's death was directly perpetrated by an angry youth, the yo uth was
apparently recruited by Yasin H ayal, a man with an ultra- nationalist agenda who had served
eleven years for the bombing of a M cDonald's. Another man, a student involved with
Alperen organization (a neo-facist group associated with the ultra-nationalist Grand Unity
Party [BBP]) , was also apprehended and charged with instigating and organizing the murder.
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The BBP denies any involvement in the killing.All three m en lived in Trabzo n, a city known
for ultra-nationalist recruitment. Were these men the link , the condu ctors between a
culturall y embedded wa riness o f free speech and an ultra-natio nalist sector of the public
galvanized against the EU and its implications? And did Dink, a man who shortly befo re his
death wrote in Agos that "The m emory of my computer is filled with angry, threatening
lin es . . . "6 become a lightening rod for that fury? For many in Turkey, Dink is considered a
hero. The hate mail flowin g into his inbox is a stark indica tio n of the division Turkey has
t~l ce d for decades. On one side, ultra- nationalists seethe at the perceived European yoke. O n
the o ther, those who suppo rt the EU bid race to grow and change Turkey with ever
lI1creasll1g urgen cy.
Erkan Mumcu, leader of the Motherland Party, indicated his belief that, "Certain
circles try to create a Turkish profile of attacking innocent doves."7 H e called the killing a
plo t to create a fundam entalist Turkish image. H e did not distinctly specifY who was behind
the plo t tarnish Turkey's image, but he did reference a rem ark m ade by Dink inte rring that
E uropeans were the real reason for the fi:iction between Turks and Armenians in addition to
alleging nepotism and corruptio n within the Turkish government.
In the wake of Dink 's death the death threats seemed to have passed on to Pamuk.
Whil e being escorted in a courtroom, Yasin Hayal sho uted out for Pamuk to "be smart" ,
implying that ifPamuk w as n ot carefi.II he could suffer the sam e fate as Dink. Pamuk is now
also getting a lot of ultra- natio nalist hate m ail similar to mail received by Dink. As a
precaution, Pamuk is n ow under close protection (protection that Dink was refused).
Public reaction to the murder has been tremendo us. While Dink 's murder is certainly
a blow to the outlook of free speech in Turkey, it has also inspired many to exercise free
speech to its fullest. Aside from the tho usands upo n tho usands of demonstrators that walk
in Dink's funeral processio n h olding signs in Kurdish , Turkish and Armenian that read " We
are all Armenian . We are all Hrant Dink", there were also those holding "301 is the
m~ll·de re r" placards. Mainstream newspapers all over Turkey are united in their outrage at
Dink's murder and their condernnation for Article 301. The public pressure to do away with
Article 301 is rising. But so is the ultra- nationalist pressure.
A301 & EU Accession
Many Turks view EU accession as a lost cause, irrelevant, and are more concerned that
the EU will ban their favorite fast food chain than with edu cation , social security, health
issues, etc. Some of Turkey's po pulo us feels that the EU is treating Turkey unfairly, fo rcing
them to jump through hoops they wo uld not otherwise have to jump through if they were
no t a Muslim nation, if they were no t Turkey. There is strong concern abo ut a European
C hristian bias towards Turkey, som e even saying "Christian Values" is the new accession
criteria, especially after the September 22, 2006 conunents of Bavarian President Edmund
Stoiber (leader of the Christian Social Union Party [SU], which has strong ties with
Ge rmany's ruling Christian Democratic Union). Stoiber proposed that deliberations o n
Turkey's accession be ended , citing what he thought to b e gross overreaction of Turkish
leaders to Pope Benedict's conunents on Islam. He is also qu oted as saying, "Turkey is not
Europe nor does it belong to the continent, because the country has such great cultural and
spiritual differences with western values."8 It has been alleged that Germany's government
shares this view but cannot com e o ut in support of it due to diplomatic constraints.
In response, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat Laciner, head of the Ankara-based USAK m ade
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some scathing remarks. "If the EU is only a Christian club, I think Turkey should not be part
of it. Because Turkey is a secular country and I am personally against to be part of a Middle
Ages understanding." Laciner goes on to call "Christianity-based Europe" a "narrowminded organization", and warns that Turkey should stay away from the "discriminative
structure and religious fundamentalism" of Europe. He also compared Mr. Stoiber to Osama
Bin Laden in "seeding religious hate" and compared Turkey's current position with that of
European Jews before World War II. "We want to see a more just and more balanced EU,"
Mr. Laciner added. "We want to establish a common future instead of obsessing with the
biases of the past."9
Turks grow restless at the strain of change and the insistence that, when change
occurs. it is not enough. They feel that enough is enough, that there is no hope for accession.
These are the sentiments that are feeding the ultra- national surge in Turkey. 10
The conservative Muslim AK party has struggled to bring Turkey closer to EU
accession. In the interest compliance with the Copenhangen political criteria the 1982
Turkish constitution underwent extensive amendment in October 2001 and May 2004 with
eight " harmonization packages" passing the Turkish Parliament in the interim. Article 90 of
the Turkish constitution was amended per EU recommendations in order to establish the
supremacy of international human rights conventions over domestic law. The civilian
control over the military was irnproved during this time as well , putting the budget back in
the hands of parliament and allowed closer scrutiny of the Turkish Armed Forces. Spending
for education was increased and now exceeds military spending. Many other reforms
involving the openness of government procedures and the strengthening of civilian control
have also been enacted.
A301 Supporters
The AKP's main opposition, the Kemalist CHp, is against furth er EU reforms. Their
attitude is made it clear in a statem ent by their deputy Orhan Eraslan, mem.ber of the justice
conunission of Turkish parliament: "30 1 is not wrong. It should not change. It is not only a
need, it is also a necessity. If we want to remain as a nation and state, it should remain."l l
In addition, Republican People's Party (CHP) leader D eniz Baykal said, "The prime
minister is looking for an accomplice to the shameful act of making it free to insult the
Turkish identity in Turkey. H e almost expects us to apologize for being Turkish. We will not
apologize." 12
The Nationalist Movement Party's (MHP) support of Article 301 has not waivered
either. Mehmet Nacar, vice secretary-general of the MHP, has asserted that criticisms of
Article 301 intentionally disregard the fourth clause ("Expressions of thought intended to
criticize shall not constitute a crime.") which Nacar claims is an indication of a hidden
agenda to destory Article 301 in order to degrade Turkishness with impunity.
Sinan Aygiin, president of the Ankara Chamber of Conmlerce, is not only a supporter
of Article 301 but has called for a harsher version . Aygun reviewed the article with a group
of experts and presented a report to Minister of Justice Cemil <;:ic;:ek saying just that.
<;:ic;:ek, the architect of Article 301, has been harshly criticized by the media . Many
believe that <;:ic;:ek is blocking any move to reform Article 301. In his own defense or
perhaps the article's, <;:ic;:ek has responded that the many critics of Article 301 have failed to
read its text. " These people do not know the previous law and the changes in it. They do
not realize what kind of implications a change in this article will provoke in this country,"
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<;::i<;:ek said. 13 <;::i<;:ek also said that the text of the law is not so important as h ow the
prosecuto rs use it or how the judges interpret it. H e claims that even if Article 301 was
abolished, if prosecutors or judges had "bad intentions" they could simpl y substitute Article
216 and continue unabated.
Minister of Tourism Atilla Ko<;:, while in supportive of Article 301 , does not believe
that the problem of Article 301's va uge text is entirely relevent and that the real issue lies in
the rnethod of jurispridence.
Prim e Minister E rdo an is not comfortable with the idea of abolishing Article 301
altogether, nor is he comfortable with the connection of Article 301 to Hrant D ink's
murder. H e has asserted that only change in the article could be the increased penalty in the
third clause for a Turkish citizen insulting Turkishness in another country.
A301 Reform
At this time a joint proposal for the amendment of Article 301 has been submitted to
the Turkish gove rmnent. It has already met with great criticism ; some say it is more of a
retreat to Article 159 than an improvement, including Ruling Justice and D evelopment
(AK) Party deputy leade r Dengir Mir M ehmet Firat who called the proposal a " throwback"
in terms of m entality. 14 Economic Development Foundation (IKV) head D avut Okutcu ,
spokesperson for the group, denies this accusation. T he p roposal retained the notion of
"Turkishn ess" but repla ced "insulting" with "derision or 'hurling invective"'. It also included
reduced penalties for the offense and puts special emphasis on the verdicts of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and defines "Turkishness" under Article 66 o f the
Constitution, which defines " Turkishness" as people who are tied to the Turkish R epublic
with a bond of citizenship are called Turks. 15 The proposal is mainly criticized for its fa ilure
to bring clear legal definition to an infamo usly manipulated article.
The proposal was prepared by IKV, Turkish Union of Chambers and ConmlOdities
Exchanges (TOBB) , Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) ,
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD) , Turkish Confederation
of Employers' Unions (TISK) , Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), Labor
Confederation (Hak-Is), Civil Servant Unions Confederation (Memur-Sen), Turkish
Broadcasters Association (TVYD) and Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers (TZOB).
Of the twelve participants, the R evolutionary Workers' Labor Union (DISK) and the
Turkish D octors Union (TTB) disapproved of the outcome, saying that the law should b e
struck down altogether. Justice Minister Cemil C icek himself was critical of the proposal ,
accusing those involved of overlooking his call to work on a concrete proposal.
In response to the proposal, Turkish Solidarity Council Spokesperson Mustafa E rkal ,
held a joint press conference in support of the current article. The Turkish Solidarity
Council is made of nearly 100 civil groups invested in the preservation of Article 301.
Others expressed outrage that supporters of the article are b eing depicted as h aving
encouraged the murder of Hrant Dink and accused the European Union of having double
standards, referen cing similar laws on European books. Ankara C hamber of C Onll11erCe
(ATO) Chair Sinan Aygun pointed out that the article protects those who want to annul it.
Largely ignored by the Turkish and the international press alike is the issue of the
fourth clause of Article 301. The fourth clause is utilized almost arbitrarily and while it
should h ave a serious impact of the interpretation of the law, judges, prosecutors and the
press often ignore it in their discussions. Obviously, those in support of Article 301 most
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conmlOnly mention it, but they too do not spend too mu ch time analyzing the benign
clause. The fact that within the controversial Article there is a clause protecting "expressions
of thought intended to criticize" should be a good indication of Turkey's progress but in
practice in ends up as a red herring.
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Article 301 is definitely of great concern to the EU with regards to Turkey's accession.
A report issued fi'om the Commission to the European Parliament and Council in regards
to the enlargement process anno unces that, "It is necessary to ensure freedom of expression
without delay by repealing or amending Article 301 of the Penal Code and by overall
bringing the legislation into line with European standards."16 Article 301 is seen to be in
violatio n of the Copenhage n Criteria, mainly regarding " human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities".
The EU trusts Turkey to solve its internal free speech issues. Beyond the amendment
or repealing of Article 30 1, there is not much in the progression of free speech in Turkey
that the EU feels it can (or indeed , is required to) effect.
Similar EU Laws
There is criticism of the EU within Turkey regarding their strong stance against
Article 30 1. EU critics and supporters of the article point o ut that rnany European
Countries have similar laws. For example, German articles 90 , 90a and 90b penalize sti ch
acts as insulting or malicio usly maligning Germany or o ne of its lands or constitutio nal
o rder, disparagement of Germany's colors, fla g, coat of arms or anthem and anticonstitutional disparagem ent of it's con stitutional organs. Punishments for the German
articles are harsher than in Article 301 and as of the middJe of 2006 , there were 72 sentences
resulting from these articles.
Italy has 290,291 and 292 of the Italian Penal Code regards degradation , insulting and
disparagement of the republic, constitutional institutio ns, military forces, flag and other state
symbols and the Italian natio n as punishable crimes. There were 21 convictions in 2000,31
in 2001,22 in 2002, five in 2003 and 28 in 2004 .
A total of 134 " criminals of degradation" were convicted under the Dutch Penal
Code in 2004,146 in 2005 and 139 in 2006 of crimes similar to those described in Article
301. The Polish, Spanish, French and Austrian penal codes have similar articles. The Danish
Penal Code includes EU nations, countries and the EU Parliament into the list of legally
"indemnified" entities. 17
However, European concerns stems mainly from the application of the law. Prime
Minister Erdo an himself has noted that the European Uni o n did not disapprove of the
creation of Article 301. Only after Article 301 was so prolifically applied did the EU raise
any objections. Also, it should be noted that while Turkey treats Article 301 as a criminal
offense, most of the articles described above are treated as civil offenses.
Calls For Change
European Parliament member Joost Lagendijk sent a letter to both Prime Minister
Erdo an and main opposition leader D eniz Baykal asking them to inunediately change
Article 301. Within the letter Lagendijk allowed that many EU countries, including his own
country, the Netherlands, had laws similar to Article 301. H owever, he also pointed o ut the
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differences in these laws. "First there is th e word 'Turkishness' in the first paragraph of Article
30 1. .. .T he second point concerns the reasoning behind the article . ... It sho uld serve the
o rderly fun ctioning of the public service," explained Lagendijk.1 8 N o ne of the high- profile
Turkish cases, h e went on, served this fun ction .
C hiefEU negotiator Ali Babacan asserts that Article 301 is not really the problem but
instead an elem ent of the Turkish m entality that allows laws such as Article 301 to be used
in a negative fashio n . " Lifting or changing Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code will not
change a great deal so long as the players concerned do not change their m enta lity. They
w ill simply find o ther articles of the Turkish Penal Code to put to use in the same way."
Babacan added, " We are attempting to realize a new philosophy with old playe rs.T lus simply
will n ot wo rk." 19
Progress Reports
A report issued o n O ctober 5, 2003 by Arie Oostlander, C hristian Dem ocrati c MP to
the European Parliam ent regarding Turkey's progress towards meeting the Copenhagen
C riteria (offi cially called "2003 R egula r R epo rt o n Turkey's Progress Towards Accession")
recognized and cataloged Turkey's progress as well as addressed issues that still required
further reform (or in some cases, any refo rm at all).
T he report focused o n the political system , the judiciary, the role of the nulitary, the
status of religio us nl.inoriti es and th eir property rights as well as Turkey's non-compliance
with several decisio ns of the E uropean Court of Human Rights. Amo ng some of the majo r
concerns of the repo rt were regarding Turkey's "a utho ritarian philosoplues". Mu ch of the
Turkish Penal C ode refl ects the influence of Italian Fascism of the 1930s and of particular
concern in the repo rt was the 1982 Turkish constitutio n w hich gives the National Security
C ouncil (NSC) a wide breadth of p owers incompatible with a civilian dem ocrac y. The
report cites NSC's role in the C ouncil of Higher Educati o n (YOK) and the Council of
R adio and Televisio n (RTUK) among others extensio ns of military powers into civilian life
without sufficient oversight that must be limited (the report also cites va rious amendments
from previous "refo rm packages" that w o rked towards this goal, such as abolishing extended
powers of the N SC, linuting access to civilian agen cies and increased fiscal transparency) .
Also emphasized was the need for Turkey to transfer power from NSC donunated
o rganizatio ns to civil society associatio ns and encouragement of social dialogue and trade
Ul11ons.
Mr. Oostlander's report raised concerns rega rding Article 27 of the C ove nant of C ivil
and Political Rights (granting ethluc, religious, and linguistic m inorities the right to pursue
their culture, religio n and language). Ag reement to such an article is co ntroversial in Turkey
largely due to the ro ughl y 15 millio n Kurds living in the country. Turkey also has laws
restricting certain property rights and religio us trailung of Catholic and Protestant churches.
R egarding the Turkish Penal C ode, Articles 312, 169 and 7 (dealing with provocation
and threats to " public security" resulting from the advocacy of class, ethluc, religious,
linguistic, and fa cial divisions) we re singled out as being used to intimidate, prosec ute and
condemn m any Turkish intellectuals and politicians to priso n sentences. C oncerns regarding
the impartiality and consistency of judges as well as the lack of proper oversight of prison
administrators (and therefo re a lack of proper evaluatio n of complaints regarding the
treatment of prison ers) were also presented in the report.
T he report m entions that Article 159 (Article 301's predecessor, " insulting the state
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and state institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic") had been
reformed in 2002, reducing the minimum sentence from on year to six months and
including exceptions for expressions of opinion intended only to criticize, and not intended
to "insult" and "deride" these institutions. However, it also warns that:
... as announced by the Turkish government, the process of reviewing existing
legal restrictions in this area has yet to be completed. In a report assessing the 3
November 2002 elections, the OSCEIODIHR concluded that the broader
legal framework and its implementation establish strict limits on the scope of
political debate in Turkey. Non-violent expression of political views beyond
these limits is still restricted by a variety oflaws and is rigorously enforced. 2o
The report goes on to explain how Turkish prosecutors have a tendency to use
alternative provisions of the Penal Code (Articles 312 and 1(9) and the Anti-Terror Law
(Article 7) to limit freedom of expression, hinder the freedom of the press (confiscation of
press equipment, heavy fines on publishers and internet censorship) as well as to prosecute
those who had been acquitted based on the reforms. The report calls for a more consistent
and systematic approach to address these issues and all future amended legislation.
The report also leaves no question that Article 90 must be altered to establish the
primacy of international law over national law, a critical step to becoming part of the
European Union. Mr. Oostlander made it clear in his report that Turkey had work to do
before it would meet the Copenhagen Criteria, but clearly stated that "Turkey is able, if it
wishes and if it considers it to be in its interest, to transform itself into a first-class EU state."
In its "Presidency Conclusions" on December 16 and 17, 2004, the European Council
praised Turkey for its progress and stated that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the
Copenhagen political criteria enough to open accession negotiations provided it adhered to
the recommended reforms. The "Conclusions" made no specific mention of Article 159 (or
Article 301, as it did not yet exist).
A report issued November 8, 2006 by Olli Rehn echoed these same concerns,
indicating that progress in Turkey has been slow. The outlook of the report was on the
positive side. In regards to Article 301, Rehn said:
We state clearly in our report that further reforms are needed, in particular to
ensure the freedom of expression. There is an open and intense debate going on
in the Turkish civil society on the notorious article 301, calling for its
amendment. Prime Minister Erdogan has invited civil society organisations to
propose amendments to the Penal Code, which is a welcome initiative. We
expect words to lead to deeds, soon. 21
Also in the report Rehn indicates that the best way to deal with Turkey is to be "firm
but fair". This is a subtle indication that the EU has no intention of budging on their
requirements, no do they have any inclination to let Turkey into the European Union (at
least not any time soon).
CONCLUSION

To date, Turkey has failed to initiate all of the reforms advised by the Oostlander
Report, most notably the drafting of a new "civilian constitution" (as opposed to Turkey's
current "authoritarian" constitution, established in 1982 after a military coup). Reforms
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have been made, such as extensive constitutional amendments geared at meeting the
Copenhagen Criteria and the establishment of the supremacy of international human rights
conventio ns over domesti c law. However, severe authoritarian elements remain, threatening
free speech in its Turkish infancy. The turbulen ce of the past century and influ ence of
authoritarian and fascist have long mired Turkey in an ideology of safety over freedom s,
exemplified in Orhan Eraslan rem arks o n Article 301.
The AK party has long been a staunch supporter of reform , striving to m eet the
requireme nts of the EU and to elevate their country to the global scale. Why then would
that same governme nt allow such high- profile campaign against free speech? After all the
hard work they've done, after all the progress they've made, w hy block the path they
themselves laid? The AKP's current diplomatic/political stan ce on Article 301 is wait-andsee. It is clear, though, that as Turkey nea rs election time, politicians are less and less inclined
to address the issu e. As described in the above pages, Turkey is divided on a gradient line
b etween freedom of expression, natio nalism , Europe, integration and the shards of the
Ottoman Empire left behind. The polarization in Turkey is palpable, in a country w here
instability has been a persistent bedfellow, so after so many years of political turmoil and
military coups it is understandable why so many would be willing to risk it - even at the
cost of personal freedom s. The natio nalist movement constantly chall enges the governm ent
to curtail free speech and go against the European Union 's criteria just as the pro-EU
fa cti o ns demand that m o re progress be made towards accession.
It is clear that the nationalist m ovem ent is the driving force behind Article 30 1 and
its counterparts. Who o r what faction serves to gain ti'om hindering Turkey's efforts to
accommodate the EU's requirements? There is a m entality in Turkey (not necessarily shared
by all Turks, but largely prevalent) of hard-won national pride. Anyone serving to diminish
that pride is not only insulting Turkey but any individual w ho is proud to call them selves a
T~lrk . Ultra-nationalist factions use this sentiment to gain a stronger g rip on society and
attempt to pull Turkey into a reactionary landslide. It is not so much that Turks do not
understand free speech as the ultra-nationalists do not trust it and see it as a tool of "enemies
of the state"; Turkey's prevailing govenunent, on the oth er hand, either cannot or does not
know h ow to balance their desire to becom e a natio nal economy with a respected presence
in the EU with the extremely powelful ultra-natio nalist factions that seek to thwart it.
Turkey may be somewhat behind on the accession requirements of the European Unio n but
it would be a poor assessment to underestimate them. The Turkish are cognizant of free
speech, they just do n 't have much experience with what it can do. Fear of the unknown
coupled with the m emory of disastrous political instability create a situation where
explo ring the param eters and ramifications of free speech ca use public outcry and
reactionary elements to surface. In Turkey, a country who not lo ng ago was ruled by
emperors and dictators, freedom of speech will be a slow and painful process. It is clear that
there is a drive within Turkey to join its Western neighbors and break free of the stigmas of
the Middle East, but there are too few who want this at the cost of b ecoming Western . It is
a tangled struggle through which Turkey must emerge whole if it ever hopes to achieve
accession. But how W estern can Turkey become before they split apart?
END NOTES

1. "Behold! The number of evil is still 666, not 301", Sunday's Zaman. January 28,
2007. < http ://www.sundayszaman .com / sunday/ detaylar.do?load=detay&link=88> .
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2. In reaction to France's legislation making it illegal to deny the Armenian genocide,
Dink reportedly said, "If this bill is adopted, I will go to France and, in spite of my
conviction, I will say it was not genocide. The two countries can then compete to see
who throws me in jail first." ("Turkey's Armenians distrust French genocide bill". October
10,2006 < http:/ /www. turkishpress.com / news.asp?id=146077>)
3. "Turkey's Chronic Headache" , The New Anatolian. September 22, 2006.
<http://www.thenewanatolian.com/opinion-15059.htm.l> .
4. "Schism: Free Speech vs. ' Insulting Turkishness'" By Ivan Watson All Things
Considered KCLU, Thousand Oaks 4 October 2006
5. "Killing of Dink shocks Turkey" BBC N ews. January 22,2007
<http://news.bbc.co. uk /2/h il europe/6288419 .stm>
6, "Hrant Dink's final article" BBC News .January 20,2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6283461.stm>
7. " Man linked to Dink murder threatens Nobel-winning author"The New Anatolian.
January 25 , 2007 < http ://wwvv.thenewanatolian.com/ tna-2 1811.html>
8. "Christian Values: New EU Membership Criteria for Turkey?" Turkish Weekly.
September 23 , 2006 < http://www.turkishweekly.net/ news.php?id=38880>
9. "Christian Values: New EU Membership Criteria for Turkey?" Turkish Weekly.
September 23, 2006 <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=38880>
10. Baydar,Yavuz "Turkey's chronic headache"The New Anatolian 22 September 2006
4 December 2006 <http://www.thenewanatolian.com/opinion-15059.huul>
11. "Turkey's Chronic. Headache,", The New Anatolian. September 22 ,2006 .
< http ://www.thenewanatolian.com.l opinion-15059 .htIul>.
12 . "The regrettable story of Article 301 "Turkish Daily News. January 25,2007
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.trlarticle.php?enewsid=64 711 >
13. "Behold! The number of evil is still 666, not 301" , Sunday's Zaman. January 28,
2007. <http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=88> .
14. Several AK Party members, including the premier himself, stood trial under Article
159. Erdogan, then mayor of Istanbul, was given a six-month sentence for reciting a poem
on charges of provoking the public.
15. The controversy from the definition of "Turkish ness" stems from the common use
oflegislative intent in interpreting Article 301 , which defines the term Turkishness as "one
would understand the common entity created by the shared culture unique to the Turks,
wherever they are living in the world. This entity is broader than the term "Turkish
Nation" and also contains the peoples sharing the same culture outside Turkey." Critics
have labeled "shared culture unique to the Turks" as racist.
16. "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007" Novenlber, 8 2006
<http://ec.europa .eul enlargement/ pdf/key_documents/20061 Nov I com_649_ strategy _pa
per_en. pdf>
17. "Behold! The number of evil is still 666, not 301", Sunday's Zaman. January 28,
2007. <http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=88> .
18. "Amend 301; Will it work?" Sunday's Zaman. February 4, 2007
<http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do ?load=detay&link= 139>
19. "If there is no change in mentality, lifting article 301 will make no difference"
Hi.irriyet Internet. February 17, 2006
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/597 4955.asp;>gid=7 4>
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20. European Parliament Report on the 2003 Regular Report of the Commission on
Turkey's Progress Towards Accession (A5-0204/2004), 13
21. "Enlargement Package: Press speaking Points" November 8, 2006
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH 1061 663&for111at=
HTML&aged=O&language= EN &guiLanguage=en>
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